Second, the Statement frames North American climate governance as being concerned with the implementation of policy made elsewhere, be it through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process or the Major Economies Leaders Forum. North American environmental policy is less about the creation of regional obligations than it is about enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of domestic and international policy goals through regional cooperation. Moreover -and quite significantly -the focus on implementation gives North American environmental cooperation a highly technocratic posture, which is reflected in the institutional structures and instruments developed to deliver environmental policy at a continental scale.
In part as a result of viewing regional environmental policy as an administrative exercise, the framers of North American environmental policy have adopted a thin version of legitimacy in relation to the development of policy. These claims of legitimacy have been rooted principally in the technical expertise of government officials and a formal version of procedural legitimacy that relies on executive delegation and domestic notice-and-comment procedures. The insufficiency of these measures has led to deepening concerns about the democratic credentials of regional environmental governance; this a concern that, if left unattended, will only increase as policymakers turn their attention to the more politically and economically sensitive questions surrounding greenhouse gas mitigation.
The Joint Leaders Statement is also exemplary in what it ignores. There is no mention of the increasingly important role being played by sub-national governments in developing and implementing transboundary environmental and energy policy in North America. In the field of climate change, the most ambitious and sophisticated policy regimes have been developed by U.S. states, and more recently, by Canadian provinces, which have had to fill a policy vacuum created by the absence of strong federal leadership on this issue. Even Mexican states such as Sonora and Neuvo Leon are engaged in various forms of cross-border climate policy cooperation. And, strong sub-national engagement in transboundary environmental and energy issues is not an anomaly limited to climate change governance. To the contrary, sub-national cooperation has become a significant force in North American environmental governance, which includes a number of important sub-regional cooperative arrangements, such the Conference of New England Governors/Eastern Canadian Premiers, the Great Lakes Compact, the ChihuahuaNew Mexico-Texas Strategic Environmental Plan and the California-Baja California Border Environmental Plan.
Finally, it is of no small significance that the Joint Leaders Statement was delivered in the context of the North American Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP). The SPP, as a regional governance structure, sought to capitalize on and extend the transgovernmental nature of North American regional governance by formally recognizing the existing system of transgovernmental networks. The innovation of the SPP was to "bundle" a sprawling integration agenda within a common framework that allowed for a degree of coherence and was subject to greater oversight by national executive branches. While the SPP leveraged the networked nature of North American environmental governance, it failed to adequately address the multi-level nature of environmental governance and, despite being more visible, exacerbated the legitimacy concerns of civil society. A little more than a year after the Joint Leaders Statement, the SPP was quietly abandoned. Nevertheless, the transgovernmental networked structure of the SPP still persists in ongoing continental environment and energy governance structures.
Like other contributors to this volume, this chapter considers the state of play in North America before the recent economic and political turbulence and also considers how governance structures might be changing as a result of this turbulence. We make a series of arguments here.
First, we note that regional environmental governance in North America has followed a definable trajectory over the course of the past decades from "unbundled transgovernmentalism" as the dominant form of transboundary governance, to a somewhat more coordinated approach linking environmental regulation to trade-induced pollution concerns and coupling the North American environment and energy sectors. In this respect, we analyze both the SPP, as the only large-scale attempt at "bundled transgovernmentalism", and the Border 2012 Program, an EPA-led initiative encompassing the U.S.-Mexico borderlands and designed to achieve a greater degree of cohesion in programming. Each initiative has its merits and shortcomings, and together they provide insight into the potential architecture for future regional arrangements. In light of these findings, we consider the viability of this trajectory to adequately address the current environmental challenges facing North America. Here our emphasis is on the ability of the three North American states to fashion a regional response to global climate change in a period of economic and political turmoil.
Transgovernmentalism in North American Environmental Governance
Across North America, environmental transboundary interactions occur primarily through a combination of ad hoc diplomacy by political officials anchored by a more permanent framework of transgovernmental ties (Craik 2009; VanNijnatten 2010) . Transgovernmentalism itself has been variously defined. In Keohane and Nye"s (1974) original -and quite narrowformulation, transgovernmentalism resulted from direct interactions among sub-units of different governments that employed cross-border activity primarily to achieve domestic policy ends (Keohane and Nye 1974) . Three decades later, Ann Marie Slaughter (2004) used the term to refer more broadly to governmental networks aimed at a broader range of purposes, including influencing international policy processes. Baker (2007: 9) notes that transgovernmentalism "has become a rather complex multifaceted activity that can take several forms, while acting as a mechanism through which state bureaucracies can construct alliances and coalitions with their counterparts in similar bureaucracies."
Transgovernmental networks in the environmental policy realm in North America exhibit certain characteristics. First, they can be both treaty-based and more informal. Much of the casework on transgovernmentalism focuses on international financial and economic regulation (see, for example, Zaring 1998 and Baker 2007) and views the networks constituted in these realms as being established through more informal means. However, as Craik and DiMento (2008: 486-7) note, some environmental transgovernmental networks in North America may in fact be established by treaty, with the treaty structure acting to more clearly define the goals of transgovernmental cooperation.
In Canada-U.S. bilateral relations, for example, we have seen a steady succession of focused, formal agreements or treaties under which commissions, boards or committees of officials meet regularly, monitor implementation and deal with issues as they arise. From the Transgovernmental cooperation, at both the national and sub-national levels, is aimed at joint data-gathering and information sharing, technical cooperation (e.g., modeling transboundary air pollution flows), capacity building (particularly in Mexico) and regulatory cooperation (e.g., mutual recognition programs). It appears to work quite well in particular issue areas and with regard to specific pollutants, where a group of officials within complementary agencies may work together on the same file, often for many years. In the air quality realm, for While opinions vary as to whether the model is malleable, i.e., whether it can be made more deliberative and representative, most analysts agree on the root of the problem. As Baker (2007: 24) explains, "...it is elitism and exclusion that defines transgovernmentalism as a form of governance, precisely because it rests on dialogues between like-minded officials that share certain overarching ideas and normative beliefs and values." Given the technical and administrative nature of these tasks, the dominance of specialized agencies/personnel in such activities, and the tendency of government agencies to be secretive in their operations, there appears to be little discursive room for nongovernmental interests.
On the Canada-U.S. border, the tendency to treat transboundary environmental cooperation as an expert-oriented, administrative exercise is particularly marked, with outside participation limited mainly to those within the scientific community. So, for example, while scientists and modelers outside government have been involved in bilateral discussions aimed at reducing transboundary air pollution on the Canada-U.S. border, there has been little role for environmental groups. On the southern border, there have been more concerted attempts both to create more deliberative structures and processes, and also to involve civil society and local communities, as we discuss below with reference to the Border 2012 program. At the subnational level, participation in cross-border discussions has been somewhat more participatory but the issue of participation itself appears to be less contentious at this level, perhaps because discussions can fly "under the political radar".
Finally -and relatedly -we would note that transgovernmental environmental interactions in North America have not tended to be "bundled" in any significant way; that is, there has been a preference for addressing issues on a case-by-case basis, generally without institutionalized linkages even where these might be suggested by the nature of the issues being addressed. In the air quality realm, for example, agency officials representing the two governments on the Air Quality Committee have successfully worked to reduce air pollutants in border areas -but one at a time and each after years of negotiation. Cross-cutting linkages necessary for adopting a more cohesive approach to environmental programming have for the most part been absent. For example, although the IJC has made important progress in cleaning up toxic "hotspots" in the waters of the Great Lakes, it is only peripherally involved in the projects being implemented by the Canada-U.S. Air Quality Committee, despite their similar geographic focus and despite the fact that air deposition is a leading source of pollution in the Great Lakes. and their environmental agencies, who have stymied any attempts by the institution (or its advocates) over the years to adopt a more independent and comprehensive view of the border environment. Perhaps for this reason, the IJC has tended to rely more on transgovernmental networking to build support across agencies at different governance levels as well as with the expert and nongovernmental communities. It might also be noted that the IJC has not devoted significant resources to studying the environmental impacts of energy choices in terms of Great Lakes pollution.
Since the mid-1990s, however, there have been some attempts to create more cohesive frameworks, to bundle initiatives across issue areas, across levels of governance and even across the environment and energy sectors. To some extent, these initiatives have also been more participatory. At the trilateral level, the North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation came into force at the same time as NAFTA and established an international organization , the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), to help decision-makers in the three countries adopt a regional view of environmental concerns. From this rather broad mandate -and in response to considerable political pressure to narrow its purview -the CEC has created a focused work program with projects relating to three priorities agreed to by political leaders: information for decision-making; capacity-building; and trade and the environment.
The CEC attempts to take a cross-sectoral approach to its projects and has, for example, devoted considerable resources to studying the linkages between different forms of electricity generation and transboundary air pollution (see CEC 1997; 2002) . However, the organization is hampered in this respect since it involves only the environmental agencies of the three countries; natural resources/energy and trade agencies, for example, are not integrated into the program structure of the organization.
The CEC also operates closely with political officials (through the Council, consisting of the three environment ministers) and the nongovernmental community (through the Public Advisory Committee). And, in all of its program activities, the CEC aims to bring government officials, scientific and technical experts as well as societal interests together in order that they may gain a common understanding of specific environmental problems and share best practices with respect to taking action on these problems. The CEC has also made a point of creating vertical linkages between its own programming and initiatives being undertaken at the crossborder regional level; for example, the CEC supported the development of the NEG/ECP"s Mercury Reduction Action Plan. At the sub-national level, there are a growing number of efforts to bundle transgovernmental cooperative activities, particularly in response to the climate change policy challenge. As noted in the introduction to this paper, it is sub-national governments who have taken a leadership role in climate policy, and there are clusters of cross-border regional initiatives -including the NEG/ECP"s Climate Change Action Plan and the northeastern Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the Western Climate Initiative (originally under the auspices of the Western Governors Association), the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Agreement and the Arizona-Sonora Climate Change Initiative -that are adopting a cross-sectoral and transnational approaches to carbon reductions. While deliberations have continued to be technocratic in nature -e.g., much of the preparatory work involves the creation of emission inventories -there have been greater efforts to involve stakeholders in collaborations, likely due to the considerable distributional implications.
On the U.S.-Mexico border, under the terms of the La Paz Agreement, environmental authorities in both countries developed the Integrated Border Environmental Plan (IBEP) in 1992, which created a broader umbrella under which specific environmental issues, formerly dealt with through the separate interagency agreements referred to above, could be addressed in a more cohesive manner. IBEP dealt specifically with air quality, water quality, and hazardous and solid wastes via working groups of agency officials. However, the implementation of the IBEP was criticized both for a lack of public involvement and an inability to address crosscutting issues such as environmental health. These perceived shortcomings led in 1996 to the Border XXI Program, which was intended to facilitate public involvement, decentralization, and interagency cooperation to a greater degree. Yet even this revised program was criticized as being too "top-down" in nature.
Perhaps the most ambitious attempt to date to create a framework for environmental and energy initiatives was unveiled in 2005 under the "quality of life" agenda of the North American Security and Prosperity Partnership. At the same time, another significant (though borderspecific) attempt to bring previously disparate environmental management efforts under one framework -the U.S.-Mexico Border 2012 Program -had just gotten underway. We discuss each of these in more detail below and argue that, while each initiative has its merits and shortcomings, together they provide insight into the potential architecture for future regional environmental governance arrangements.
Two Forms of Bundling: The SPP and Border 2012

The Security and Prosperity Partnership
The SPP took the dominant modality of North American cooperation and consciously turned it into a more comprehensive governance strategy. The SPP was not, of course, focused on the environment, but rather included both environment and energy items within a much larger integration agenda. The twin SPP agendas, one for security, the other for prosperity, were developed in response to concerns that the North American integration project had stalled at a time when the region was facing increasing competitive pressures from Europe and Asia. Much of the heavy lifting of economic integration was accomplished through NAFTA, but there remained a number of outstanding non-tariff trade barriers such as complicated rules of origin requirements and regulatory divergence. The trade concerns became amplified after the 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S., which resulted in new border security measures being imposed on both U.S. borders. The effect of these measures was to impede the free flow of people and goods across North American borders, which in turn caused considerable economic interruptions to the highly integrated North American economy. The immediate response to the security concerns was the negotiation of separate border security arrangements with Canada and Mexico, but, as with the trade concerns, there remained a large number of outstanding matters to be addressed.
Thus, the longer term response was to put in place a process that identified specific issues to be addressed, requiring either bilateral or trilateral cooperation, and give a mandate to state officials to negotiate the necessary arrangements.
The approach very deliberately was intended to focus on matters that did not require a renewed legislative mandate. The SPP had no foundational treaty, it created no permanent institutions, and it involved no delegation of authority beyond the state. Instead, the process relied on a set of working groups made up of agency officials to negotiate the various initiatives identified in the Security and Prosperity Agendas. Because negotiators were operating within the confines of existing legislative mandates, the instruments employed were often informal frameworks or ministerial level MOUs. The subject matter of negotiations tended to be technical in nature, such as the harmonization of technical standards, mutual recognition of domestic regulatory processes and cooperation in science and technology. As an approach to regional governance, the SPP was simply an extension of an already preferred approach to cooperation.
Indeed, a great number of the over 300 initiatives identified in the SPP agendas were pre-existing and the subject of ongoing negotiations within existing working groups.
As a process for cooperation on environment and energy issues, the SPP agenda is neither far reaching nor comprehensive. The agenda items were specific in nature and appeared on their face to be a rather idiosyncratic mixture of initiatives. This latter was most likely the result of the agenda items in these areas being made up of pre-existing initiatives, such as transboundary EIA and bird habitat preservation, both of which were previously being addressed under the NACEC. There is no noticeable attempt within either the environment or energy areas to identify and address pressing issues, such as transboundary air and water pollution or climate change. None of the prevailing environmental disputes between the parties, such as the Devil"s Lake water diversion, or the sustainable use of shared aquifers between the U.S. and Mexico, were identified as issues suitable for resolution through this process. Instead, the focus was very much on managerial issues with low political salience.
The principal innovation introduced by the SPP was to take these disparate matters and bundle them together within a unified process that was subject to high level executive oversight.
By identifying quite specifically the objectives of the process and including within the agendas expected timeframes for the successful completion of each item, the SPP focused bureaucratic attention and allowed for the prioritization of resources. The annual North American Leaders Summit brought increased scrutiny to the progress of various initiatives, and a degree of high level accountability for the outcomes of the process. That said, the quiet demise of the SPP demonstrated the substantial shortcomings of transgovernmentalism.
The process was deservedly criticized for its lack of process legitimacy. The North American Competitive Council, an advisory body to the leaders on the SPP process that was made up of business leaders from the three North American states, was a lightning rod for criticism. The preferential access given to business elites within the process was a powerful symbol for non-governmental groups and confirmed the club-like character of transgovernmental networks, which tend to be able to determine for themselves network membership. The higher profile of the SPP process actually brought greater attention to working group outcomes.
However, the negotiation process itself was a black box, with little information being made available regarding membership in working groups or the working group meetings themselves.
The framers of the process maintained that the legitimacy concerns were overstated because no formal decisions or actions were taken by the networks themselves and any change in domestic policies would have to be subject to domestic administrative procedures. This portrait of networks a benign talk shops misses the mark. Governance through networks is rarely formal and binding, but it retains its governmental nature nonetheless since networks discussions are intended to influence domestic policy choices (Craik and DiMento 2008) . Lack of access to these channels of policy creation represents a real loss of influence that cannot be compensated for by ex poste domestic administrative procedures.
While most of the focus of criticism has been on the lack of procedural legitimacy, the absence of any substantive vision, environmental or otherwise, was equally damaging. The failure of the SPP framers to articulate any broader purpose beyond improved cross-border efficiencies and enhanced continental security was a deliberate attempt to avoid discussions of more comprehensive and institutionalized forms of continental integration, but actually exacerbated fears that the SPP threatened national sovereignty because the process had no clearly defined boundaries. The absence of any normative vision allowed the SPP"s critics to project their concerns that the SPP was "deep integration" by stealth on the process, regardless of government protestations to the contrary.
It is difficult to assess the success of the SPP"s environment and energy measures in isolation because the SPP was conceived of as an ongoing process of cooperation, not an endsoriented negotiation. Among the outcomes of the process was a general agreement on regulatory cooperation, an agreement on energy related science and technology cooperation, the harmonization of energy efficiency standards and labeling for appliances, and an agreement on bird conservation. These ought to be considered modest achievements and reflect the rather anemic ambitions of the environment and energy agenda items themselves, which were adjective to the SPP as a whole.
Nonetheless, the SPP contains some useful lessons for future regional cooperation. The process-oriented approach coupled with centralized executive oversight creates forums for cooperation among regulators that maintain a good deal of flexibility, but still provide for executive "steering". The agenda setting function allows for the identification of priority issue, and provides participating officials with a mandate to negotiate. It also signals to network members those issues which the executive does not want addressed in transgovernmental settings. Climate change, given the Bush (and subsequently, the Harper) administration"s equivocal position on the issue, is a clear example of an issue that lacked sufficient domestic consensus to be addressed at a bureaucratic level. The informal structure of networks enables sub-national participation on multi-level governance issues that characterize the environment and energy fields. The most important lesson relates to the inability of the SPP to engender public legitimacy. Even the relatively benign cooperative issues within the energy and environment agenda resulted in concerns that the process would lead to a race-to-the-bottom and would result in a loss of sovereign control over natural resources.
Border 2012: An Alternative Model
In this context, it is worth exploring the Border 2012 model on the U.S.-Mexico border as it provides a national-level framework bundling together disparate environmental initiatives undertaken by the two national governments, across a range of different agencies, and it also provides structures for including nongovernmental interests in agenda-setting and implementation.
As implied above, Border 2012 is the third attempt to develop and implement a borderwide environmental program. The criticisms of both the IBEP and Border XXI made it clear that the two national governments needed to recognize the diversity of concerns at the local and subregional levels and marry a "bottom-up" structure with national level funding and oversight.
Border 2012 thus establishes three types of coordinating bodies -regional workgroups (for California-Baja California, Arizona-Sonora, New Mexico-Texas-Chihuahua and TexasCoahuila-Nuevo Leon-Tamaulipas), border-wide workgroups focusing on broad topics (e.g., cooperative enforcement and compliance) and policy forums centered on particular problems (e.g., air, water and waste). All of these efforts, in which state and local governments play significant roles, are managed by the "National Coordinators", the US EPA and Mexico"s SEMARNAT.
This attempt to achieve vertical coordination, so that border environmental issues might be more effectively addressed by various levels of government, faces particular challenges.
First, while the U.S. federal government has become more enthusiastic recently about promoting local participation, Mexico is much more centralized in a political and budgetary sense, and it is not clear whether and how state and local governments south of the border can actively shape border environmental decision-making. Further, as Zorc (2004) notes, the lines of communication and responsibility between the federal bureaucracies and the workgroups and task forces is ill-defined; it is assumed that federal officials will take advice from these lowerlevel deliberations but there is no formal mechanism for ensuring that this is the case.
There have been some difficulties in terms of realizing Border 2012"s participatory vision, as is evident from the patchy attendance at meetings, the lack of legal status for certain groups, such as Mexican indigenous peoples, who may want to participate more fully in decision-making, and a lack of capacity on the part of many civil society and indigenous groups in the border region. Nevertheless, Border 2012 places great emphasis on a decentralized, crossborder regional approach to programming, and participation by civil society, environmental groups and indigenous peoples on both sides of the border is expressly encouraged. The program is described in official terms as a "results-oriented program" that takes a "bottom-up approach" to addressing the environmental and public health needs of the border region; in other words, issues and projects are to be identified and implemented at the local level (U.S. EPA There are two weaknesses in the Border 2012 framework that should be noted here, however. First, because the program is EPA-led in both an administrative and budgetary sense, rather than being run from the centre of government, it has not been able to engage continued executive focus and support, as is evidenced by the submersion of Border 2012 programming under the weight of border security and fence-building. By contrast, the SPP, with its high-level executive oversight, specified timelines and prioritization of resources, ensured that -for a time -officials in all three countries were focused on the ends political leaders endorsed at their annual summits.
Secondly, Border 2012 is primarily pollution-focused, and prioritizes environmental and public health. It involves both the federal and state environmental and public health agencies, as well as the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission, the CEC, the Good Neighbour Environmental Board, the IBWC -and a range of organizations representing the expert community, civil society organizations and indigenous peoples. It does not, however, address broader environmental-energy linkages; the U.S. Department of Energy, for example, is not a Border 2012 "partner". Here, the SPP"s ability (if not exactly its willingness) to address crosssectoral issues is notable.
Economic Crisis and Political Instability: Unbundled and Unravelling?
The transgovernmental nature and focus on implementation in the North American transboundary context are actually well suited to address the environmental issue that will surely be the most significant yet -climate change. Given the technical and administratively heavy nature of the instruments currently under consideration in the climate policy field, such as emissions trading and tax regimes, transgovernmentalism offers the possibility of expertoriented, flexible and overlapping networks that can build capacity and are responsive to executive control. Further, we see the gradual move away from ad hoc arrangements towards a more coherent and centrally directed framework as being essential to both the vertical integration of climate policy, given the dual existence of international commitments and a variety of climate policies emerging from "below", and to the horizontal integration of a variety of cross-cutting climate policy choices.
However, we are also of the view that the current trajectory needs to be altered fundamentally in order to accommodate the plurality of state and non-state participants in North American climate policy and to address legitimacy concerns. On this latter point, the U.S.-Mexico Border 2012 program may supply a useful model for more inclusive and participatory environmental governance, both from a process perspective, as it endeavours to achieve both vertical representation across governments and the inclusion of those outside of government, and substantively, given its commitment to project proposals from local actors and communities.
Slaughter (2004) has argued that transgovernmental networks represent the possibility for creating a more effective and just world order, in which governments are able to both represent and regulate their people. However, the principle challenge facing those who wish to implement such an ideal is how to combine local/bottom up initiative with central coordination and resourcing. In this respect, the combined lessons of SPP and Border 2012 offer some potential avenues for innovation, and future regional environmental governance is likely to borrow from both models.
Yet, given the current economic crisis and attendant political instability, what are the prospects for innovations in continental environmental and energy governance? Climate change, as a set of interlinked policy problems, creates governance challenges that may be more difficult to meet in a time of political/economic instability. For example, tension between federal and sub-national government units inheres in multi-level governance, and regional climate change governance, which has substantial distributive implications, will require North American political leaders to more directly confront and address these frictions. Climate change policy also squarely raises issues of asymmetrical federal arrangements across borders since the U.S.
and Mexican federal governments exercise much greater control over energy and environmental matters than the federal government in Canada has been willing or, indeed, may be constitutionally able, to exercise. However, it does not appear that national governments seem prepared to undertake the considerable burden-sharing across regions that is required.
Further, as we contemplate the possibilities associated with the creation of carbon markets, for linking these markets across borders, and also for assuring adequate monitoring and compliance systems to support interjurisdictional markets, governments -and particularly the U.S. federal government -have become more protectionist and also more parochial in a policy sense. Relatedly, as we contemplate the enormous capacity-building requirements that will accompany the use of almost all climate policy instruments, there seems to be less interest in transboundary cooperative endeavours, and certainly fewer resources allocated to such programs.
And, although the link between energy choices and environmental sustainability has never been clearer, national governments in North America are focused in the immediate term on security of energy supply, with some rather timid experiments in renewable energy cooperation.
